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DA INTELLIGENCE REPORT
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REPORT NUMBER	FROM	PREPARED BY	REPORT ON	TYPE	DATE
R-23-57	AMIA JAPAN	COL H. J. WILLEY	JAPAN	10 Jan 57	30 Jan 57
SUBJECT: Opinions of		INTERVIEWERS		EVALUATION	DATE OF INFO.
NAITOH Tatsushiro on Japan's Defense (U)		See below		3-3	10 Jan 57
SUMMARY: (Referenced: 8-118, 120, 201, 230, 233, 251-56.)					

On 16 Jan 57, Rō called on NAITOH Tatsushiro, ex-Colonel of the Imperial Army, at the latter's office, and discussed various matters concerning Japan's defense. NAITOH's remarks are summarized in report.

Regrading data cannot be predetermined

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CONFIDENTIAL

DA INTELLIGENCE REPORT	CONFIDENTIAL	NUMBER	FROM	PAGE
(DoD DOD RPT 6010 in accordance with Instruction to SR 552-301-1)		R-23-57	AMIA Japan	2

1. On 10 January 1957, Reporting Officer called on HATTORI Toshishiro, Colonel of the Cavalry Army, at the latter's office near Doshing Heights and had a discussion lasting an hour and a half with him on various matters concerning Japan's defense. The following is a summary of the discussion.

2. HATTORI was most critical of the development of the defense forces. He said that almost every day he receives unsolicited calls in his office from various military officials who present officers in the Self Defense Force and that these officers are not satisfactory in the standards within the Self Defense Force. He says that they emphasize the lack of professionalism or competency of the officers of the forces and particularly complained about the widespread graft and corruption within the Defense Agency and the SW. The existence of these conditions, according to HATTORI, indicates a situation which unless corrected will completely prevent the SW from becoming the status of a combat-qualified, efficient fighting force. The reason for this, he says, is that this situation is undermining the morale and efficiency of the officers and enlisted men so that in the event of a national emergency they cannot be counted on for effective military operations. Instead, the personnel would be more apt to desert or surrender rather than give up their lives. He said dramatically that the U.S. is developing a force which, unless the morale situation is improved, might turn its bayonets against the US's back.

3. HATTORI states that the major reason why the foregoing condition exists is that the leadership within the Defense Agency is incompetent from the very top. HATTORI was particularly critical of the personnel selection and management within the SW, stating that little effort is made to provide competent people in key spots or to select qualified individuals for personnel vacancies, and claimed that this inefficiency exists from the lowest level all the way to the top of the Defense Agency. He pointed to the significant number of uniformed officers from General grade on down who are from non-professional origins, citing the fact that five of the six division commanders are civilian generals. He referred to the unsatisfactory personnel condition within the Defense Agency itself, stating that the civilian officials are not trained in military matters and their professional interests do not lie in the field of defense. He also said that there is a direct political chain of command which extends from Mr. Nakano (one of the leading political bosses within the Liberal-Democratic Party) through the former Director General FUJIWARA Takeo and the present Deputy Director General HATTORI. He claimed that those people profit financially from their ability to control the affairs of the Defense Agency and for that reason desire to perpetuate their control. He said that they are, consequently, opposed to the appointment of any individual who would break this chain of command by becoming the new Director General of the Defense Agency. For this reason they strongly oppose the appointment of ex-Admiral NAKAJIMA Michioeburo. HATTORI himself feels that the appointment of NAKAJIMA would be a very excellent one; because of his professional background and his personal integrity, he could be expected to take the drastic action necessary to clean up the Defense Agency. HATTORI said that the stories and rumors opposing NAKAJIMA's appointment for various reasons actually have their origin within the Defense Agency and are planted by the individuals who stand to lose if NAKAJIMA gets the job.

4. HATTORI stated that he feels that the United States is making a mistake in insisting that the ground forces be increased to the 100,000 man total under the Six Year Plan. He feels rather it would be better to accept a forces' strength of 120,000 consisting of competent and thoroughly trained officers and enlisted men. With this well trained group as a small cadre, recruits could be taken in in larger numbers whenever there was a need for expansion and trained in a short period of time to form the main Army units to defend Japan. HATTORI referred to the manner in which the Japanese army expanded during the period subsequent to World War I. He feels that the Japanese Army should take cognizance of the low combat efficiency of the present Japanese forces and adopt this system in order to achieve a fighting force number of the world, rather than pronouncing a reluctant Japan into supporting an impractical form of combat capabilities which are questionable.

5. Regarding NAKAJIMA's own staff they HATTORI's remarks could be summarized into two general criticisms: First, that the personnel management within the SW is very poor, and second, that a new type of military organization using the cadre system recommended by HATTORI should be adopted. In regard to the latter, since the

NOTE: No formal reply from HATTORI to
the recommendations of the SW was made. It is
believed that the SW will be asked to consider
the recommendations of the HATTORI report
and to submit a formal report to the SW.

DA INTELLIGENCE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

R-23-57

Army Japan

3

program of military aid is based on a nation's statement of its equipment requirements for its own planned troop strength, a change of the type suggested by MATSUNI would mean a major review in the concept of the aid program for Japan and this should be the result of a clear indication by Japan for U.S. consideration. MATSUNI agreed that this was correct but that there are not within the Defense Agency, at the present time, individuals sufficiently competent in military affairs to recognize the desirability of this type of defense structure and to do the detailed planning necessary for it. With regard to the first problem, that of personnel, I indicated that it would be difficult for the United States side to approach the defense agency for any corrections and asked how he would suggest a personnel reformation be effected. He said that he believed that it could not be done by a low level approach but could only be done by a very senior individual from the U.S. side - such as the American Ambassador or the Commanding General, Far East Command - directly approaching the Prime Minister and stating his great concern over the personnel inefficiency within the Defense Agency and the JDF; recommend tactfully but strongly that this must be given first priority if the Defense Forces are to develop into a capable organization. He felt that this approach should be accompanied by a recommendation that a Director General of the Defense Agency be appointed who is capable of carrying out a personnel reform.

COMMENT

1. MATSUNI has recently published an article in the 3 January edition of the *Sankai-jiin* newspaper in which many of the points brought out by him in this conversation are included as well as some others. A translation of this article is attached herewith in order to provide fuller background on his thinking. His comments on the corruption within the JDF are not included in the article. Attention is invited to the fact that he points out in this article such things as Japan's great vulnerability to air attack, Japan's need to engage in collective defense in order to provide her adequate security, the need for revisions in the present US-Japan security pact in order to collaborate with the U.S. on an equal footing and to eliminate Japan's subordination to the U.S., and for Japan to accept the obligation tacit in entry to the United Nations for sending Japanese troops overseas if necessary.

2. MATSUNI's office is located at No. 2, 1-Chome, Sodohara-cho, Ichigaya, Shinjuku, about a stone's throw from the Forming Heights Headquarters of the Far East Command. His office is located in a small, ramshackle type of office building typical of many small Japanese enterprises. I was not shown through the office building and therefore was unable to make any estimate of the number of employees or the scope of his activities. His enterprise is called the Historical Data Research Institute (Shijiru Kaishi Icho) which has been using various former Army officers to conduct historical and other types of research on military matters and from time to time publishes books and pamphlets. One of the most recent publications was a special edition of the magazine *Ichiy* which was an overall revision of the history of the Imperial Army and contained articles written by various ex-Army officers.

3. MATSUNI's comments on the graft and corruption in the Japanese Defense Agency and the Self Defense Force are believed to be exaggerated. To some extent these conditions undoubtedly exist, as indicated in my R-201-56. As a study of Japanese governmental and political history will indicate, a certain amount of this is to be expected, as in any Asian - if not Western - nation. However, his implication that the only individuals of integrity in Japanese public life are the military men, an erroneous concept formerly held by the unprofessionals soldiers, cannot be accepted. In effect, MATSUNI is condemning the "ins" because his friends are presently on the outside.

4. As far as the effect on the morale of the lower ranking personnel of the JDF is concerned, this factor also is believed to be overemphasized (See my R-233-56). Reports of observations made by many American officers throughout the JDF indicate that morale is universally good. The number of disciplinary cases of the type which would indicate poor morale, such as absence without leave, is exceptionally low. The enlisted men seem to generally react enthusiastically of their liability for the military service. They do not appear to pay any particular attention to the activities of the persons in central headquarters, i.e., the Defense Agency, nor do they seem to reflect adversely their attitude toward military service.

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DA INTELLIGENCE REPORT (G-2 Information to Command and Instruction to G-2 Officers)	CONFIDENTIAL	NUMBER FROM	PAGE
		R-22-57	Arms Japan
			4

5. The Japanese have misinterpreted the principle of civilian control to the extent that there is over-control of the uniformed personnel by the civilians of the Defense Agency, partly to perpetuate their own power and partly to prevent a re-emergence of military control of the state. Despite this, however, one aspect of MATIGRI's comments are undisputedly correct - the fact that the incompetent officers of senior rank (Lt Colonels up through General and senior civilian officials) must be eliminated if the professional standards of the SDF are to improve. By R-116 and 230-56 bear on this topic. It should be noted that the source of these reports is also an ex-Imperial Army officer who is known to be a close friend and former subordinate of MATIGRI's. With senior officers within the SDF who are close associates of MATIGRI, it is to be expected that his views will find many adherents among the SDF.

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1 Incl
Translation of newspaper article (UNCL)

CONFIDENTIAL

DA INTELLIGENCE REPORT (On this form only in case there are instructions in SR 526305-5)	CLASSIFICATION	REPORT NUMBER	PAGE 1 of 1
		R-23-57	Arma Japan Incl 1

SANKI-JIJI (Translation of signed Article)
January 3, 1957

HOW JAPAN'S DRAFT SHOULD BE

By Takujiro HATTORI, Director of the Historical Data Research Institute

After a great war, as a rule, peace-loving sentiments come to the fore and efforts are made to maintain permanent peace. This is a common phenomenon which can be verified from a historic point of view. However, so far as the period following World War II is concerned, peoples in the world are sharply opposed to each other while advocating peace in Asia, and the said period looks like a preparatory stage for another great war. I think this is a peculiar phenomenon.

Causes of a war, in my case, are built up in the course of many years. Therefore, when we consider from the viewpoint of causes of a war, I think that we should regard the latest disturbances (TH: in the Middle East and East Europe) as having constituted a cause for a future terrible international explosion. In other words, it may be said that future world situation will be such that there may be no great war ("WORLD WAR III") for the coming several years but that there is no knowing when and where minor wars (civil wars, wars between smaller countries and wars between big countries and smaller countries) will break out.

Then, under such a turbulent world situation, how should we deal with defense of our country? I wish to introduce here a piece of information about West Germany's defense policies.

Since 1950, West Germany has been deliberately mapping out defense programs by setting up the BLANK Organ, and in March last year, she amended the Defense Basic Law, and then successively promulgated all necessary laws concerning establishment of armament, such as the Soldiers Law and the Conscription Law. Under a mutual agreement with the NATO, she has launched upon construction of air and ground forces of about 500,000 men to consummate in 1950. On October 16 last year, West Germany dismissed Defense Minister BLANK to be succeeded by Atomic Energy Minister SIRAUSS, and it seems that she is taking steps to make a drastic revision of her defense program which has just been started.

It was the opinions of ex-Colonel BONIN (phonetic) who had been purged from the BLANK Organ, and ex-staff Major WINSTEIN (phonetic), military affairs reporter of the Frankfurter Allgemeine, that exercised a strong influence over West Germany's defense program. Their opinions also enjoyed the support of the majority of the people. Should West Germany alone become a target of attack by the Soviet Union, she will not be able to defend herself without the help of her allies, even if she has an Army of 500,000 men. And, when it is anticipated that the allies' help to West Germany will lead to a great war in which Washington and London also will be exposed to atomic attack, we, the West Germans, will probably be left to our fate. Therefore, West Germany must have nuclear weapons even by reducing her air, ground and maritime forces, and to have atomic weapons will be the only way for West Germany to enable herself to preserve peace and independence.

This is the viewpoint on which West Germany's defense program is based. I think this is worth taking up as a reference datum in studying our defense issue, because, from the viewpoint of collective defense, Japan and West Germany have many things in common.

Now is the age when it will take only less than an hour for a airplane to reach Tokyo from an airbase in the Asian Continent. The age is drawing near when guided missiles launched from a place in the Far East Soviet territory will be able to attack Washington or New York over 5,000 miles in only thirty minutes. Such being the situation, even the big powers of the U.S. and the Soviet Union are becoming unable to defend their territories by their own hands. Thus, while the countries in the world will be gradually forced by virtue of the influence of moral centering around the United Nations, the world which, in actuality, cannot always rely upon the U.N. can only be obliged to adopt a collective defense formula.

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		K-23-57	Arma Japan

The Western camp now has the NATO (participated in by 15 countries), the Balkan Treaty (3 countries), the Pugwash Treaty (5 countries) and the SEATO (8 countries). In the Far East, Japan, the Republic of Korea and Nationalist China are now engaging in collective defence by concluding the U.S.-Japan Security Pact, U.S.-ROK Mutual Defence Treaty and the U.S.-Nationalist China Mutual Defense Treaty with the U.S. respectively. I believe that Japan will be unable to successfully defend herself unless she preserves this defense formula for the future.

I think that the U.S.-Japan Security Pact is so unilateral that it should be amended without delay, not only because the Pact permits the U.S. to station her armed forces without any limitations as to time, strength and location, but also because it is a one-sided treaty under which the U.S. is free from any definite obligation to Japan in her defense. We ought to collaborate with the U.S. only on an equal standing, and I firmly believe that subordination to the U.S. is unbearable to us.

Some people say that the world War II type armament would be unnecessary in the A-bomb age, but I think that this is an argument unworthy of consideration. This is because future warfare may be classified into the following three categories: 1) total warfare in which nuclear weapons are used, 2) local warfare of World War II type, in which nuclear weapons are not used, and 3) something like rioting or civil war and as the latest disturbances in Hungary and Suez show, we have to think that wars which fall under the latter two categories are more likely to break out.

Whether or not the Self-Defense Force is really "armed force" has repeatedly been discussed in the Diet. In this connection, it is clear that, whatever explanation may be given, the existing Constitution does not permit the maintaining of what is generally accepted as armed forces. In this sense, I demand an early amendment of the Constitution. I regard the Self-Defense Force in its basic character not as a body for full-fledged armament but as a preparatory organ for the armament which will be established after the Constitution is amended. If so, it would be meaningless to expand year after year the body which is not an armament, and I think that efforts should be concentrated to build the groundwork for true armament.

Speaking of ground forces, for instance, if Japan trains 120,000 officers and noncommissioned officers instead of keeping 180,000 men, and attach importance to education and training of officers and N.C.O.s, it will be easy for Japan to build up a necessary scope of armed forces at a bounce when necessity arises in the future. As to the air force, Japan will be able to keep up, flexibly and efficiently, with the incessant progress of weapons by laying major stress upon airbase facilities and training of personnel, instead of seeking to increase the number of combat planes, and limiting the types and numbers of airplanes to those necessary for training purposes for the time being.

It may be necessary to keep a certain number of naval vessels, but in view of the world situation where remarkable changes are taking place in the types and efficiencies of naval vessels, I think Japan should adopt a thoroughgoing "small vessel policy". I am also afraid that a serious defect may be caused in Japan's defense setup unless she makes strenuous and autonomous efforts in the research on guided missiles and other new weapons instead of merely relying upon the U.S. for the results of her researches.

Supreme responsible leaders of the U.S., Britain, France and the Soviet Union have taken every opportunity to stress the necessity of civilian defense. They say that in future war it would be impossible to have their countries defended without civilian defense, and that the civilian defense is no less important than armament itself. Nevertheless, what is the present state in Japan? Also, it goes without saying that armed forces which cannot supply themselves with weapons, materials and foodstuffs by their own hands will have no ability to accomplish military operations. What is the present state of Japan's defense measures as viewed from the standpoint of munitions industry and military supply?

Above all, what is it that some people seek to shirk the obligation of sending Japanese troops overseas although Japan has been admitted to the United Nations? Can Japan briskly act on the international arena as an independent nation, so long as she tries to claim her rights without undertaking her obligations? I am not

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			H-23-57	Army Japan	

going to give an immediate and bold answer about the problem of such important defense measures, but I am afraid that Japan's defense may become very difficult unless not only the Government and the Diet but also the whole people seriously tackle the problem.

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